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JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF VETERANS APPEALS:
SEARCHING OUT THE LIMITS*
Frank Q. Nebeker**
I have been asked to talk to you about the United States Court of
Veterans Appeals-specifically, challenges and trends in defining
the scope of the court's jurisdiction. As a brand-new court, and one
without any antecedent, the court began to establish precedent to
deal with all aspects of its jurisdiction. In fact, it is still very much
in the process of setting such precedent.
For the first time, the court brought the principle of stare decisis
to the veterans' community. The principle required considerable re-
adjustment within the Department of Veterans Affairs (Department
or VA). The VA's regional offices and the Board of Veterans' Ap-
peals (Board or BVA) were deciding benefits applications ad hoc. At
the Board level there was little effort to achieve consistency among
decisions by different panels. Moreover, veterans' benefits claimants
were unprepared for the adversarial nature of an appellate court.
The administrative adjudication, both at the agency of original juris-
diction and indeed at the Board level has been and remains a pater-
nal.system. The claimant need only present a "well-grounded" claim
(much like a prima facie case) to bind the Secretary of Veterans
Affairs to assist in the prosecution of the claim by guiding the evi-
dentiary efforts on behalf of the claimant and by broaching issues
not mentioned, but fairly embraced in the claim. The adversarial
nature of judicial proceedings-particularly as relates to compiling a
record for appellate review-has had far-reaching effects within the
Department.
In addition, issues relating to the court's jurisdiction required
new, and sometimes complex, analysis of the rule of finality as ap-
plied to actions by the Department. A claimant could relitigate the
same claim again and again by reopening or alleging "clear and un-
mistakable error" in a prior decision. These exceptions to the rule of
finality have raised significant issues relating to the court's
jurisdiction.
Because the subject is complex, I am going to limit my remarks.
First, I will give you a thumbnail sketch of the court's history. Then
I will discuss the precedent that has developed relating to the three
* These remarks were prepared for delivery to the Veterans Law Symposium,
sponsored by the Maine Law Review, University of Maine School of Law, Portland,
Maine, on September 24, 1993.
** Chief Judge, United States Court of Veterans Appeals. I would like to express
my appreciation to Sandra P. Montrose for her valuable assistance in preparing these
materials.
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major statutory limitations on the court's subject matter jurisdic-
tion. Finally, I will talk briefly about developments relating to the
court's jurisdiction in other selected areas.
One observation: as you read this in print, it will have notes to let
you know what came from where. In general, however, the Court of
Veterans Appeals does not use footnotes. The only other appellate
court to eschew footnotes is your neighbor, the Supreme Court of
New Hampshire. In our court's opinions you may see
them-rarely-in a dissent or separate concurrence, but we aim to
keep things as clear and simple as we can.
I. HISTORY OF THE COURT
On November 18, 1988, when President Bush signed the Veterans'
Judicial Review Act (hereinafter VJRA),1 the United States Court of
Veterans Appeals came into being. The court provided judicial re-
view of veterans' benefits claims for the first time.2
This court is one of the very few courts of national jurisdiction in
this country's history, and one of even fewer created without any
antecedent.3 It is an Article I court,4 headed by a chief judge sitting
with two to six associate judges.5 All judges are appointed for a term
of fifteen years." Cases are heard by judges sitting alone, in panels of
three, or en banc. 7
1. Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105 (1988) (codified at 38 U.S.C. §§ 7251-7298
(Supp. III 1991)).
2. See Barton F. Stichman, The Veterans' Judicial Review Act of 1988: Congress
Introduces Courts and Attorneys to Veterans' Benefits Proceedings, 41 ADMIN. L.
REv. 365, 366 (1989).
3. Six courts of national jurisdiction were created prior to the Court of Veterans
Appeals. The United States Supreme Court was created with the ratification of the
Constitution. In 1942, the United States Emergency Court of Appeals was created to
adjudicate the wartime price control program of World War II. The United States
Court of Military Appeals was created in 1950. In 1974, there was a Temporary Emer-
gency Court of Appeals that heard disputes arising from wage and price stabilization
legislation. A special court for the regional reorganization of the railroads was created
in 1974.
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court was created in 1978, without antece-
dent. Very few other federal courts, however, were created without any predecessor
tribunal. For example, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals was created from
the Court of Customs Appeals in 1929; in 1982, it merged with the Court of Claims
and became the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
The federal district courts and the circuit courts of appeals (other than the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) have limited geographical jurisdic-
tion. See generally Erwin C. Surrency, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL COURTS (1987); Rob-
ert A. Carp & Ronald Stidham, THE FEDERAL COURTS (1985); Ogilvy, The Social Se-
curity Court Proposal: A Critique, 9 J. OF LEGIs. 229 (1982).
4. 38 U.S.C. § 7251 (Supp. III 1991).
5. Id. § 7253(a).
6. Id. § 7253(c).
7. Id. § 7254(b).
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By statute, the court is independent for budget purposes. The
court submits its budget request directly to Congress "without re-
view within the executive branch."8 Thus, the court's budget is sub-
ject neither to control by the VA, nor to review by the Office of
Management and Budget.
The court hears direct appeals, filed by claimants, from adverse
final decisions of the BVA of the VA." The court has authority to
affirm, modify, or reverse a BVA decision, or to remand the matter
"as appropriate." 10 Limited review of the court's decisions is availa-
ble in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit."
The Federal Circuit has viewed challenges to the application of a
law or regulation to the facts of a veterans' benefits claim as outside
the scope of its jurisdiction, and has dismissed those cases.12
The court has jurisdiction to promulgate Rules of Practice and
Procedure.13 Initially, an informal Rules Advisory Committee pro-
posed interim rules, which were adopted effective December 18,
1989. These rules were based on the relevant Federal Rules of Ap-
pellate Procedure. The court's present Rules of Practice and Proce-
dure superseded the interim rules on May 1, 1991. The court now
has a permanent and quite active Rules Advisory Committee,
chaired by J. Michael Hannon, Esq., of Washington, D.C.14
When the court's first three judges had been confirmed and sworn
in, with a small staff and in very small rented offices, the court be-
gan operations. The postal service delivered the first notices of ap-
peal, the clerk docketed the cases, and the court was in business.20
Before reaching a determination on the merits of any appeal, how-
ever, the court began to tackle the task of defining its jurisdiction.
The court is now at full strength and in its permanent facility,' yet
8. Id. § 7282.
9. The Department of Veterans Affairs, formerly the "Veterans Administration,"
was upgraded to Cabinet-level status in March of 1989. Pub. L. No. 100.527, § 2, 102
Stat. 2635 (1988).
10. 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a) (Supp. 1m 1991). See also id. § 7261(a).
11. Id. § 7292 (1991). See, e.g., Livingston v. Derwinski, 959 F.2d 224, 225 (Fed.
Cir. 1992) (construing its jurisdiction as "limited").
12. The dismissal orders in these cases rely on Liuingston, and are not themselves
citable as precedent.
13. 38 U.S.C. § 7264(a) (Supp. Ell 1991).
14. The Rules Advisory Committee, appointed by the court, periodically meets
with the clerk and proposes amendments to the rules when need arises.
15. The court's first judges were Chief Judge Frank Q. Nebeker, and Judges Ken-
neth B. Kramer and John J. Farley, M. The court began operations on October 16,
1989. See 54 Fed. Reg. 42,437 (1989) (announcement of court's commencement of
operations). By mid-September 1990, the court had its full complement of associate
judges. The other four judges are Hart T. Mankin, Ronald hM Holdaway, Donald L.
Ivers, and Jonathan R. Steinberg.
16. The court moved to its present location at 625 Indiana Avenue, NW, Wash-




it continues to address jurisdictional issues in their various
permutations.
II. SCOPE OF THE COURT'S JURISDICTION
Three statutory requirements limit the court's subject matter ju-
risdiction: an appellant must (1) have a final BVA decision;1" (2)
have filed, on or after November 18, 1988, a notice of disagreement
(NOD) with the agency of original jurisdiction that initially adjudi-
cated the claim or claims addressed by the BVA;15 and (3) have filed
a notice of appeal (NOA) with the court within 120 days of the date
on which the notice of a BVA decision is mailed.1 9
Case law relating to "finality" of a BVA decision and to timeliness
of an NOA has developed to the point where precedential holdings
should cover most of the jurisdictional circumstances of nearly all
new appeals. As discussed below, however, because of the nature of
proceedings within the VA, case law relating to the NOD as a juris-
dictional factor will continue to develop in the future. I will acquaint
you with a few of the variations the court has encountered.
A. Final BVA Decision
1. Finality Requirement
The court has exclusive jurisdiction to review final decisions of the
BVA. 20 Very early in its existence, the court was required to address
issues relating to the requirement that an appellant have a final de-
cision of the BVA.
The court's first published opinion, In re Quigley,21 accompanied
an order dismissing the appeal. The Chief of the Medical Adminis-
tration Service had sent a letter to Mr. Quigley notifying him that
his fee-basis card2 2 was to be revoked. The court held that the ap-
peal was premature because there was no final decision from the
BVA. The court concluded that it would have "appellate jurisdiction
to review a BVA decision declining jurisdiction. 2 3 Finding that Mr.
Quigley had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, the court
found it unnecessary to address whether it had jurisdiction under
17. 38 U.S.C. § 7252 (Supp. 11 1991).
18. Pub. L. No. 100-687, § 402, 102 Stat. 4105, 4122 (1988).
19. 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a) (Supp. III 1991).
20. Id. §§ 7252(a), 7266(a). See Harris v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 180, 182 (1991)
(holding that, "[r]ead together, [§§ 7252(a) and 7266(a)] require that a claimant
seeking to appeal to the Court must have a final BVA decision." (emphasis in origi-
nal)); see also Bond v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 376, 377 (1992).
21. 1 Vet. App. 1 (1990) (veteran sought emergency hearing and injunction
preventing revocation and preserving his fee-basis card rights).
22. Id. at 1. With a fee-basis card, a veterans' benefits recipient can, under certain
conditions, receive services from non-VA medical providers for whose services the VA
pays.
23. Id. at 2.
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the All Writs Act,2' even if it liberally construed his communication
to the court as a petition for extraordinary relief.
25
A little later, however, the court examined whether there was an
exception to the "finality" rule-i.e., whether the court has the
power to grant any petition for extraordinary relief when it lacks
subject matter jurisdiction to entertain a direct appeal. In Erspamer
v. Derwinski,26 the court held that it has authority to act under the
All Writs Act. Mr. Erspamer had filed a claim in the late 1970s,
seeking service connection for his leukemia, which he claimed re-
sulted from his exposure to ionizing radiation while in service. After
Mr. Erspamer's death in 1980, his widow continued to pursue a
claim for service-connected death benefits and for accrued disability
benefits. In 1989, she petitioned the court for a writ of mandamus to
compel the VA to comply with two BVA decisions (issued over a
period of ten years) remanding the matter to the VA regional office
for adjudication.
The court held that it had jurisdiction in appropriate circum-
stances to issue extraordinary writs to VA officials.2 First, the court
is a "court[ ] established by Act of Congress,"28 the term used in the
All Writs Act. Second, section 7265(b) of title 38 of the United
States Code provides that the court would "have such assistance in
the carrying out of its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or
command as is available to a court of the United States."29 Third,
section 7261(a)(2) of title 38 gives the court authority to "compel
action of the Secretary unlawfully withheld or unreasonably
delayed."30 Finally, to hold otherwise would "frustrate the Congres-
sional desire for judicial review" where failure of the VA to act
would "prevent[ ] a claimant from ever attaining a BVA decision
which would be subject to review. ' '3 1
In Erspamer, the court declined to exercise its power to issue ex-
traordinary relief, but retained jurisdiction. It noted that Mrs. Er-
spamer could seek appropriate relief if the VA regional office had
not acted on the claim within six months after the decision." The
24. The All Writs Act provides that "all courts established by Act of Congress
may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions
...." 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1982).
25. In re Quigley, 1 Vet. App. at 1-2.
26. 1 Vet. App. 3 (1990).
27. Id. at 7.
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1982).
29. 38 U.S.C. § 7265(b) (Supp. III 1991). The Erspamer opinion also quotes state-
ments of Senator Alan Cranston and Representative Don Edwards which support the
view that Congress intended the court to have the power to issue writs. Erspamer v.
Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. at 6-7.
30. 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(2) (Supp. Im 1991).
31. Erspamer v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. at 7.
32. Id. at 12.
19941
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Secretary appealed to the Federal Circuit, but the appeal was dis-
missed by agreement of the parties when the benefits were
granted. 3
Subsequently, the court addressed "the other side of the coin,"
considering whether it had jurisdiction to address an issue raised by
a claimant but not addressed by the Board. In Travelstead v.
Derwinski,"4 the court held, disagreeing with the Secretary, that it
could address an issue raised by the claimant and decided by the
regional office, but not addressed by the Board. The court reasoned
that administrative inaction, under such circumstances, has pre-
cisely the same impact on a claimant as denial of relief.3 The BVA
could not preclude judicial review by casting its decision in the form
of inaction, rather than express denial of relief as to the issue.8"
In other early decisions the court explored its jurisdiction to hear
any matter that did not arise from direct appeal of a final adverse
BVA decision. The court held that, although it is an Article I court,
it would adopt a "case or controversy" limitation paralleling that in
Article III courts.3 7 Thus, like the Article III courts, the court lacks
jurisdiction in any matter that is or has become moot. The court
also has held that it does not have the power to enter a declaratory
judgment."' It reasoned that the Declaratory Judgments Act-9 gives
such authority to "any court of the United States. '40 That term, the
court concluded, is confined to Article III courts as defined in sec-
tion 451 of title 28 of the United States Code,41 and thus is not ap-
plicable to the Court of Veterans Appeals since it is not included in
that section.
Moreover, the court ruled in Darrow v. Derwinski42 that it lacks
jurisdiction to review the Secretary of Veterans Affairs' considera-
tion of equitable relief. The court concluded that it had no jurisdic-
tion to provide appellate review because the BVA had no authority
to review such actions or refusals to act by the Secretary. With no
final BVA decision on equitable relief, there was nothing for the
court to review. 43
33. See Erspamer v. Derwinski, No. 90-7001 (Fed. Cir. June 28, 1990) (dismissal
order issued as mandate).
34. 1 Vet. App. 344 (1991).
35. Id. at 348 (citing Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093,
1099 (D.C. Cir. 1970)).
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Mokal v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 12 (1990); Swan v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.
App. 20 (1990).
38. Nagler v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 297, 306-07 (1991).
39. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1988).
40. Id.
41. Nagler v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. at 306-07.
42. 2 Vet. App. 303 (1992).
43. Id. at 306.
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In Harrison v. Derwinski"4 and Lefkowitz v. Derwinski," the
court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to promulgate a rule permit-
ting class actions. The court reasoned that it could not, by rule, ex-
ercise jurisdiction over claimants who did not otherwise meet the
jurisdictional requirements of the VJRA. In addition, the court
found, such a rule is unnecessary because the court's precedential
decisions would have binding effect upon the Department in adjudi-
cating the same or similar claims. Therefore, potential members of a
"class" would get the benefit of the precedent, whether it controls
because of identity of facts and issues or due to a logical extension
of the earlier decision.
2. Variations on the Finality Theme: Motions For
Reconsideration by the BVA
The finality of a BVA decision is abated when the adversely af-
fected claimant files a motion for reconsideration by the BVA before
filing an NOA to the court.4" Notice from the Chairman of the BVA
that reconsideration has been denied or notice by the claimant that
the request for reconsideration is withdrawn makes the BVA deci-
sion final. The date of either of these actions begins the running of a
new 120-day appeal period to the court-but only if the motion for
reconsideration by the BVA was filed within the initial 120-day ap-
peal period.47 When a motion for reconsideration is pending before
the Board, and the claimant files a "protective" NOA with the court,
the court lacks jurisdiction and must dismiss the appeal. The dis-
missal is without prejudice to any appeal filed after the BVA denies
reconsideration or issues an adverse decision upon reconsideration. 48
A corollary also holds. When a claimant has. fied a timely NOA to
the court (assuming there is also an NOD that gives the court juris-
diction), and then requests reconsideration by the Board, the court
has jurisdiction of the appeal. If the Chairman is inclined to grant
reconsideration, the Secretary must notify the court and move for
leave to entertain the matter.4" Under these circumstances, the
Chairman lacks jurisdiction to act without leave of the court; the
"grant" of reconsideration without leave is a nullity and does not
strip the court of jurisdiction by abating the finality of the decision
appealed to the court.5"
44. 1 Vet. App. 438 (1991).
45. 1 Vet. App. 439 (1991).
46. Rosler v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 241, 249 (1991); Breslow v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.
App. 359, 362 (1991).
47. Rosler v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. at 249.
48. Breslow v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. at 364-65.
49. Cerullo v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 195, 198-201 (1991).
50. Id. at 200-01.
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Recently, in Patterson v. Brown,52 the court considered its juris-
diction to review a denial of reconsideration by the Chairman of the
BVA. Mr. Patterson had filed a timely NOA from a BVA decision
denying a waiver of loan guarantee indebtedness. The court stayed
proceedings to permit him to pursue reconsideration by the Board.
When the Chairman denied reconsideration, Mr. Patterson sought
review of the denial. The court held that it has jurisdiction to review
decisions of the Chairman to deny an appellant's motion for recon-
sideration. This jurisdiction is limited, however, to cases where the
motion for reconsideration is based on new evidence or changed cir-
cumstances. Based on limitations set by United States Supreme
Court decisions, the court found that it could not review a denial of
reconsideration where the BVA would merely take another look at
the same record.52
3. "Finality" Summed Up
The court, then, has jurisdiction over appeals from final decisions
of the BVA. While it has A-Writs jurisdiction,"3 such jurisdiction
will be exercised only in extraordinary circumstances and in aid of
the court's potential jurisdiction. An examination of the "finality" of
a BVA decision raises issues that relate to my next topics: What
constitutes a timely NOA? and what is required for an NOD that
confers jurisdiction on the court?
B. Timely Filed Appeal
The VJRA requires the filing of an NOA within 120 days of the
date on which the notice of a Board decision is mailed.5 The court
has construed this requirement strictly, deeming "the timely filing
of a notice of appeal. . . mandatory and jurisdictional." 5 Both this
court and the Federal Circuit have held that section 7266(a) of title
38 of the United States Code "defines the jurisdiction of the Court
and 'does not authorize the court to extend that time,'" even under
the doctrine of equitable tolling.5s
51. 5 Vet. App. 362 (1993).
52. Id. at 365 (citing Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Locomotive Engineers, 482
U.S. 270, 280 (1987)).
53. See supra note 24.
54. 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a) (Supp. III 1991).
55. Elsevier v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 150, 152 (1991) (quoting Torres v. Derwin-
ski, 1 Vet. App. 15, 17 (1990) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 224,
229 (1960))).
56. Jones v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 362, 363 (1992) (citing Butler v. Derwinski,
960 F.2d 139, 141 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (quoting Machado v. Derwinski, 928 F.2d 389, 391
(Fed. Cir. 1991))). In Jones the court concluded that "to the extent this Court's deci-
sion in Elsevier o. Derwinski suggests that the doctrine of equitable tolling is 'poten-
tially applicable' to the 120-day statutory period for noting an appeal to this Court,
we deem the Butler decision to have overruled it." Jones v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. at
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As discussed above in relation to issues of finality of BVA deci-
sions, a claimant's filing of a motion for reconsideration within the
120-day judicial appeal period postpones the start of the appeal pe-
riod until the BVA mails notice to the claimant that it has denied
the motion for reconsideration. 57 Additionally, the court has held
that the 120-day period does not begin to run until the BVA sends a
copy of its decision to the appellant and the appellant's representa-
tive at the last known address of each. 8 As for flawed mailing (e.g.,
to the incorrect representative), the period begins to run from the
time the claimant and representative actually receive notice of the
BVA decision.9
Finally, the court has not applied a "mailbox rule." Rather, to be
timely, an NOA must have been received by the clerk by the end of
the 120th day. 0 Rule 4 of the court's Rules of Practice and Proce-
dure permits filing by facsimile or other printed electronic transmis-
sion. However, when filing is by electronic transmission, a confirma-
tory written NOA must be received by the court within ten days
after the date of facsimile filing.61 Failure to submit a confirmatory
writing, however, has not been deemed to defeat jurisdiction, be-
cause the confirmatory written NOA is merely a procedural step
subsequent to the actual vesting of jurisdiction upon timely receipt
of the facsimile.
C. Timing of Notice of Disagreement
1. The Issue That Has Outlasted Predictions
The VJRA provides that the court may review only those final
BVA decisions that were preceded by an NOD filed with the agency
of original jurisdiction (e.g., the claimant's VA regional office) on or
after November 18, 1988, when the VJRA became law.02 When the
court began operations, I predicted confidently that the jurisdic-
tional issues relating to the timing of the NOD would "go away"
with the passage of time. My reasoning was that as November 18,
1988 receded further into the past, all BVA decisions from which a
timely NOA could be filed would of necessity deal with claims that
arose on, after, or shortly before that crucial date and would have
been adjudicated by the regional office on, after, or shortly before
that date so that the claimant's NOD would certainly have been
363 (quoting Elsevier v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. at 154) (citations omitted).
57. Rosler v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 241, 249 (1991).
58. Chadwick v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 74, 76 (1990); see also 38 U.S.C.
§§ 7104(e), 7266(a) (Supp. 11 1991).
59. Ashley v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 307, 311 (1992).
60. Torres v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 15, 17 (1990); U.S. Vet. App. R. 4; see also
Chadwick v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. at 76.
61. U.S. Vet. App. P, 3(a).
62. Pub. L. No. 100-687, § 402, 102 Stat. 4105 (1988).
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filed so as to give the court jurisdiction.
I have been wrong. The court has now been in operation nearly
four years, yet the NOD continues to be probably the most widely
contested and vexing jurisdictional issue before the court. The issue
will eventually become moot, but we may be well into the 21st cen-
tury before that happens. An understanding of the definition and
function of an NOD, as well as a little background about the way
the VA operates, will help explain why the NOD remains
problematic.
2. Definition and Function of the NOD
An NOD is defined by statute and VA regulation. The statutory
requirements for an NOD are set forth in section 7105(b) of title 38
of the United States Code.6 3 It is, by VA regulation, "[a] written
communication from a claimant or his or her representative expres-
sing dissatisfaction or disagreement with an adjudicative determina-
tion by the agency of original jurisdiction (AOJ or regional office)
and a desire to contest the result."" Section 7105(b) provides in
pertinent part that an NOD must be filed with the AOJ, that is, the
agency which entered the initial review or determination concerning
a claim;65 that an NOD must be fied within one year from the date
of mailing of notice of the determination; 68 and that an NOD "must
be in writing and may be filed by the claimant, the claimant's legal
guardian, or such accredited representative, attorney, or authorized
agent as may be selected by the claimant or legal guardian. '1 7 For
purposes of simplification, from now on I will refer to the AOJ as
the "regional office," because in most cases, that's what it is.
The VA's governing regulation requires that an NOD be a "writ-
ten communication," 68 while the statute requires that it "must be in
writing."6 However, in Tomlin v. Brown,7 0 the court recently con-
strued the regulation to impose no technical formal requirements for
an NOD beyond the requirements set by the statute.7 1
The purpose of an NOD, within the meaning of the court's juris-
dictional statute, is to initiate appellate review by letting the VA
know that a claimant intends to appeal to the BVA.7 2 When a claim-
ant files an NOD, the regional office must respond by preparing a
63. 38 U.S.C. § 7105(b) (Supp. III 1991).
64. 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 (1993).
65. 38 U.S.C. § 7105(b)(1) (Supp. III 1991).
66. Id.
67. Id. § 7105(b)(2).
68. 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 (1993).
69. 38 U.S.C. § 7105(b)(2) (Supp. 11 1991).
70. 5 Vet. App. 355 (1993).
71. Id. at 357.
72. See 38 U.S.C. § 7105(a),(b) (Supp. III 1991).
[Vol. 46:5
JURISDICTIONAL LIMITS
"statement of the case. '7 3 This must be sent to the claimant, who is
then required to perfect the appeal by completing and filling out a
VA Form 1-9, specifying the relief the claimant seeks from the
BVA.7 4 The VA Form 1-9 has, at times, been used by claimants to
express disagreement with a regional office action. One of the juris-
dictional issues that the court had to consider is whether a VA Form
1-9 could serve as an NOD that would give the court jurisdiction of
an appeal.
For the court to have jurisdiction of an appeal from a BVA deci-
sion, the NOD leading to the BVA's review of a particular claim
must have been filed on or after November 18, 1988. Congress in-
cluded the NOD requirement to keep the new court from being in-
undated with appeals at the outset.75 The reasoning was that be-
cause it took the Department close to a year to move from NOD to
final BVA decision, the new court would be capable of full operation
before the first NOA was filed.76 In addition, making the NOD a
jurisdictional "event" had the effect of permitting the Board to ad-
just to the new requirement that it must articulate "reasons or
bases," which the VJRA also required.7
3. Whether There Can Be More Than One NOD
In reviewing the records of some of the early appeals to the court,
we noted that the regional office would sometimes make several de-
cisions on the same claim over a period of months, or even years.
The claimant would file an NOD after the first time the claim was
adjudicated. Sometimes he would ask the regional office to reevalu-
ate his claim, and sometimes it would do so, and would issue an-
other-still adverse-decision. Sometimes he would send new evi-
dence to the regional office, and it would take another look at the
claim and would issue another decision. Sometimes the BVA would
review the record and the action of the regional office, and send the
matter back to the regional office for further development (perhaps,
for example, another medical examination of the claimant), and the
regional office would issue a new decision.
After each action by the regional office, the claimant or his repre-
sentative would write to that office, expressing disagreement with
the regional office decision. Some of these statements of disagree-
73. Id. § 7105(d)(1); 38 C.F.R. § 20.200 (1993).
74. In January 1992, the Department replaced the VA Form 1-9 with VA Form 9.
See 38 U.S.C. § 7105(d)(3) (Supp. M 1991); 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.200, 20.202 (1993) (stat-
utory and regulatory provisions relating to perfecting a "substantive appeal" by sub-
mitting a VA Form 9).
75. See, e.g., 134 Cong. Rec. S16,650 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1988) (statement of Sen.
Cranston).
76. Id.
77. 38 U.S.C. § 7104(d)(1) (Supp. 11 1991).
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ment may have been filed with the regional office before November
18, 1988, but another one or more may have been filed on or after
that date. The court had to decide whether any statement of disa-
greement after such a readjudication could be an NOD that would
give the court jurisdiction. Initially, the court decided that such a
statement, even if it was submitted on a VA Form 1-9, could indeed
be a jurisdiction-conferring NOD. In Whitt v. Derwinski,78 the court
consolidated four cases varying this procedural fact pattern, and so
held.
In Whitt, the court held that where the regional office adjudicated
a claim more than once, for whatever reason, the first expression of
disagreement filed after any such adjudication was an NOD. If it
was filed on or after November 18, 1988, the court had jurisdiction
of the appeal.7 9
When the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit subsequently
addressed this issue in Strott v. Derwinski, ° however, it found that
an expression of disagreement with an adjudication by the regional
office when it "is acting in an appellate role ... cannot function as
the statutory basis for Veterans Court jurisdiction."81 In Strott, the
Federal Circuit ruled that, "[t]o the extent that Whitt v. Derwinski
suggests otherwise, it is overruled. '82
On April 15, 1993, the court issued its en banc decision in Hamil-
ton v. Brown,8 3 holding that: (1) there can be only one valid NOD as
to a particular claim, extending to all subsequent regional office and
Board adjudications on the same claim until a final decision has
been rendered in that matter, or the appeal has been withdrawn by
the claimant, and (2) a VA Form 1-984 appeal as to a particular
claim cannot itself be an NOD that would give the court jurisdiction
where an earlier NOD had been filed.85
4. Variations on the NOD Theme
The legal principles relating to an NOD that will give the court
jurisdiction have now been set out. However, there appear to be
countless possible permutations of the NOD issues. For example, a
panel of judges recently decided that an oral expression of disagree-
ment with a regional office's initial action on a claim, made during a
regional office hearing, had all the statutory attributes of an NOD
78. 1 Vet. App. 40 (1990).
79. Id. at 43, 45-46.
80. 964 F.2d 1124 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
81. Id. at 1128.
82. Id. (citation omitted).
83. 4 Vet. App. 528 (1993) (en banc).
84. The VA Form 1-9 (or VA Form 9) is filed by a claimant to "perfect" an appeal
that has been initiated by an NOD. See 38 U.S.C. § 7105(a) (Supp. 111 1991); 38
C.F.R. §§ 20.200, 20.202 (1993).
85. Hamilton v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. at 538.
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once the hearing was transcribed and the oral statement became
"written.""6 The date of filing of that NOD was the date of the tran-
scription by the VA.
87
Other, even more recent decisions, have held that the claim of a
widow is separate from, even though derived from, that of her de-
ceased veteran husband. In such a case, even where the veteran's
NOD as to his claim was filed prior to November 18, 1988, the
widow may have a new NOD that would give the court jurisdiction
of her appeal. This NOD would be the first statement of disagree-
ment filed by the widow or her representative in response to the
initial adjudication of her claim by the regional office." The court
has also held that a widow's letter to a regional office expressing
disagreement with action on her husband's claim is not an NOD as
to her claim, where the regional office had not yet addressed her
separate, derivative claim.89
Another noteworthy NOD variation occurs when the BVA ad-
dresses, in a single decision, a number of claims that have been filed
separately and adjudicated at different times. When the claimant
then appeals to. the court, he can have "good" NODs as to some of
the claims, but not others. The court will go forward to reach the
merits on the claims over which it has jurisdiction, but must dismiss
the appeal as to the claims for which the NOD was filed before No-
vember 18, 1988.90
III. OTHER JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES
Very briefly, I will now highlight a few other significant jurisdic-
tional issues for you. These relate to (1) the reopening of a claim on
"new and material evidence"; (2) the requirement that a claim be
"well grounded"; (3) review of "old" BVA decisions for "clear and
unmistakable error"; (4) the "collateral order" exception to the rule
that BVA decisions must be final to be reviewed; and (5) concurrent
jurisdiction over National Service Life Insurance matters. Finally,
the new statute applying the provisions of the Equal Access to Jus-
tice Act (EAJA) to the court requires the court to examine the scope
of its jurisdiction in still another area. 1
86. Tomlin v. Brown, No. 91-2165 (Vet. Ct. App. July 16, 1993).
87. Id., slip op. at 4.
88. Zevalkink v. Brown, No. 91-1683 (Vet. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 1993).
89. Cates v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 399 (1993).
90. See Hamilton v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. at 537; cf. Tucker v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.
App. 201, 202 (1992).
91. The Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572,
§ 506(a), 106 Stat. 4506, 4513 signed by the President on October 29, 1992, applied
the provisions of section 2412(d) of title 28 of the United Staten Code (the Equal
Access to Justice Act, or EAJA), to the court.
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A. Claims Reopened With New and Material Evidence
Years ago, a veteran may have filed a claim, for example, for ser-
vice connection for a particular disability. When that claim was de-
nied, the claimant may have failed to pursue any appeal from the
regional office's decision or he may have received a final, adverse
BVA decision. Let us assume that all of this happened so long ago
that it was impossible for the claimant to file a timely appeal be-
cause the court was not in existence. Needless to say, such a claim-
ant would have to have filed an NOD long before November 18,
1988.
Nevertheless, such a claimant could attempt to reopen his claim
by submitting to the VA regional office evidence that he believes is
"new and material. ' 92 Such an effort would cause the VA to revisit
the claim. The claimant could then obtain court review of any sub-
sequent adverse BVA decision. An adverse BVA decision is "final,
9O3
but not in the same sense that a civil judgment becomes final under
Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The VA has
statutory authority to consider once again, at any time, a claim re-
opened with new and material evidence.9 4 Such a claim, both con-
ceptually and legally, is a "different" claim from the initial one
which has been denied, even if it has the identical objective as the
earlier claim, for example, to obtain service-connected benefits for a
disabled right shoulder.95 If the regional office action is adverse to
the claimant on this "different" claim, he can file an NOD. Where
that NOD has been filed on or after November 18, 1988, the court
has jurisdiction of a timely appeal from a final BVA decision on the
"reopened" issue.
The question of whether evidence is "new and material" is a ques-
tion of law that the court reviews de novo.99 If the BVA denies re-
opening because it finds that evidence submitted by the claimant in
the effort to reopen is not new and material, the court will affirm
that decision when it finds that the BVA committed no error in that
determination. In such a case, both the BVA and the court have
exercised their jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction.
Where the BVA erroneously concludes that the claim has been
"reopened," or, without addressing that threshold issue, erroneously
reaches the merits, however, the result is different. The court con-
cluded in McGinnis v. Brown97 that where the court determined
that the evidence submitted in the attempt to reopen was not new
92. 38 U.S.C. § 5108 (Supp. III 1991).
93. Id. § 7103(a).
94. Id. § 5108.
95. Suttman v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 127, 136 (1993).
96. See Colvin v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 171, 174 (1991); Thompson v. Derwinski,
1 Vet. App. 251, 252-53 (1991).
97. 4 Vet. App. 239 (1993).
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and material, the BVA lacked jurisdiction to reach the claim; its de-
cision must be vacated, and it is directed to vacate any regional of-
fice decision that reached the merits 8 In such a case, the court rea-
soned, the "claim [is] a finally denied claim which has not been
reopened and there was no claim to adjudicate on the merits or ap-
peal to the BVA."99 Because the BVA had no jurisdiction to reach
the merits, neither does the court; the court's action "reestablish[es]
the finality of the previous denial. 100
B. Requirement That a Claim Be "Well Grounded"
Similarly, neither the regional office nor the BVA has jurisdiction
to adjudicate a claim that is not well grounded.10' That is, the claim
must be put forward with "evidence that must justify a belief by a
fair and impartial individual that the claim is plausible."102 The de-
termination whether a claim is well grounded is a matter of law. -03
Where the regional office and BVA have adjudicated a claim that is
not, as a matter of law, well grounded, "there was no claim to adju-
dicate on the merits. . .. "1,4
C. Claim Based on Allegation of "Clear and Unmistakable
Error"
The en banc court consolidated two cases, Russell v. Principi and
Collins v. Principi,105 to address the issue of whether it had jurisdic-
tion to review otherwise unreviewable past decisions of the BVA
where a claimant raised the issue of "clear and unmistakable error"
in a previous decision. The court held that it has jurisdiction, but
that review is strictly limited.
The court concluded, initially, that title 38 of the Code of Federal
Regulations, section 3.105(a), which authorizes the Board or regional
office to revise previous decisions where there was "clear and unmis-
takable error" is a valid regulation. The Secretary derives this au-
thority from section 7103(c) of title 38 of the United States Code,",
which permits correction of "an obvious error in the record."' In
making its review as to clear and unmistakable error, the BVA must
base its decision on the record and the law that existed at the time
98. Id. at 244.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. 38 U.S.C. § 5107(a) (Supp. M 1991).
102. Grottveit v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 91, 92 (1993) (citing Tirpak v. Derwinski, 2
Vet. App. 609, 611 (1992)).
103. King v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 19, 21 (1993).
104. Grottreit v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. at 93.
105. 3 Vet. App. 310 (1992).
106. 38 U.S.C. § 7103(c) (Supp. 1H 1991).
107. Russell v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. at 314.
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of the prior regional office or BVA decision.108 When it finds error in
such a decision, the error must be "undebatable, or, [one] about
which reasonable minds cannot differ." 10 9
When a regional office and, ultimately, the BVA adjudicate the
issue, and when there is an NOD that gives the court jurisdiction,
and a timely NOA from the BVA decision, the court can then review
the claim of clear and unmistakable error. This is true even though
there is no NOD or NOA that would give the court jurisdiction of
the earlier BVA decision, which the claimant alleges was tainted by
such error.10
Review by the court of such a "collateral attack" on an earlier
decision, however, is strictly limited. First, the BVA must have ad-
dressed the precise issue; the claimant cannot raise it for the first
time before the court."' Second, the court's review is limited to de-
termining whether the BVA decision was "arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."1 2 In
addition, as in any other case, the court will review "to determine
whether adequate 'reasons or bases' were given for the instant BVA
decision" addressing the issue of clear and unmistakable error in a
prior decision.113 Finally, once the court has reviewed a decision of
the BVA on the issue of clear and unmistakable error, that issue
may not be raised again." 4 The same finality applies if the regional
office addresses the issue and that regional office decision is not ap-
pealed to the BVA, or if a claimant fails to file a timely appeal to
the court from a BVA decision finding no clear and unmistakable
error.
125
D. "Collateral Order" Jurisdicdion
The court has recognized the "collateral order" exception to its
general rule that appeal lies only from final BVA decisions. In Cole-
man v. Brown," 6 the court took jurisdiction of an appeal from a
BVA decision affirming an adjudication of incompetency by the re-
gional office. A VA regulation gives the Veterans Service Officer ju-
risdiction and authority to modify a regional office's determination
of a benefits claimant's incompetency." 7 In Mr. Coleman's case, the
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 314-15.
111. Id. at 315.
112. Id. (citing 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(3)(A) (Supp. III 1991)).
113. Id. (citing 38 U.S.C. § 7104(d)(1) (Supp. III 1991)); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1
Vet. App. 49 (1990).
114. Russell v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. at 315.
115. Id.
116. 5 Vet. App. 371 (1993).
117. 38 C.F.R. § 3.353 (1992); see C.F.R. pt. 13 (1993) for a discussion of the role
and duties of a "Veterans Service officer."
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BVA affirmed the regional office's finding, even though no Veterans
Service Officer had been involved.
Upon the court's request, the Secretary and amici submitted
memoranda agreeing that the BVA decision was final for purposes of
court review. Noting that "agreement by the parties alone cannot
confer jurisdiction,"1 1 the court observed that its inquiry into final-
ity stemmed from the fact that a Veterans Service Officer "might
recommend that a veteran not be determined incompetent and that
recommendation followed." 1 9 The Board, however, had undertaken
to make a final decision, rather than awaiting action by a Veterans
Service Officer. Under the circumstances, the court reasoned, each
day that Mr. Coleman continued under an unlawful determination
of incompetency constituted an irreparable loss, which could not "be
undone for those days.'1120
Citing Stack v. Boyle1 21 and Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan
Corp.,122 the court vacated the determination of incompetency on
merits not relevant here.1 2 3 Where, however, appeal can lie from an
interlocutory action of the BVA, questions of claim and issue preclu-
sion (res judicata) still lurk. In deciding Coleman, it was unneces-
sary to address such issues exhaustively; they remain for another
case, another day.
E. Concurrent Jurisdiction Over Claims Related to National
Service Life Insurance
In Young v. Derwinski,'24 the court held that, notwithstanding
statutory language1 25 providing United States district courts with ju-
risdiction over National Service Life Insurance claims, the court also
had jurisdiction over these claims. This is true where the claimant
appeals to the BVA and, if dissatisfied with that decision, appeals to
the court.1
26
F. Applications for Attorneys Fees Under EAJA
In Jones v. Derwinski,27 the court considered whether it had ju-
risdiction to entertain applications for attorneys fees under the
118. Coleman v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. at 374.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. 342 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1951).
122. 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
123. Coleman v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. at 375.
124. 1 Vet. App. 70 (1990).
125. 38 U.S.C. § 1984(a) (Supp. 1H 1991).
126. Young v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. at 72-73.
127. 2 Vet. App. 231 (1992). The appeals on the merits in Jones v. Derwinski, 1
Vet. App. 210 (1991), and Karnas v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 308 (1991), were consoli-
dated on the EAJA issue.
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Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA).'"8 Finding no waiver of sover-
eign immunity that would permit the court, not then expressly in-
cluded under EAJA, to entertain such applications, the court denied
the pending applications. 129 Jones was appealed to the Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit.
On October 29, 1992, while Jones was pending before the Federal
Circuit, the President signed the Federal Courts Administration Act
of 1992.130 This Act makes the provisions of EAJA applicable to pro-
ceedings in the Court of Veterans Appeals. On that basis, the Fed-
eral Circuit vacated this court's decision in Jones and remanded the
case.
13 1
The Federal Courts Administration Act provides that EAJA ap-
plies to any case pending in the court on the date of enactment, as
well as any appeal filed after that date. 132 The court is currently
considering applications for attorneys fees under EAJA where the
issue is the meaning of the term "pending" as used in the Act. In
deciding whether it has jurisdiction over these applications, the
court must address the issue of whether the term "pending" refers
to the merits of the underlying appeal, or whether it is sufficient
that an EAJA application was "pending" on that date. The court is
presently considering this matter en banc.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court of Veterans Appeals is the "new kid on the block"
among judicial appellate tribunals. As a new court, without any an-
tecedent, its first task has been to examine and articulate the scope
of its jurisdiction. The court may someday reach the point where,
barring new legislation, it will have precedent to apply to all con-
ceivable jurisdictional issues. Jurisdictional questions in veterans
benefits claims, however, appear to be infinite in their variety. Such
questions will continue to engage the court well into the future.
128. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d) (West Supp. 1993).
129. Jones v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. at 231-32.
130. Pub. L. No. 102-572, 106 Stat. 4506 (1992).
131. Jones v. Principi, No. 92-7047. 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 31416, at *2 (Fed. Cir.
Nov. 19, 1992) (opinion not citable as precedent).
132. Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 506(b), 106 Stat. 4506, 4513 (1992).
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